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California Supreme Court Survey
March 1987-August 1987
The CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
startingpoint for researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.

I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE ..........................................

A. A sexual harassmentclaimant who alleges ongoing
emotional distress is vulnerable to a court-ordered
mental examination without the presence of counsel;
however, inquiries into the claimant's unrelated
sexual conduct are permissible only in extraordinary
cases: Vinson v. Superior Court .........................
B. A motion for a new trial made subsequent to the trial
court's granting a dismissal, but prior to the actual
entry of judgment, is deemed to be timely filed, and
the granting or denial of the motion for new trial by
the trial court extinguishes its jurisdiction over the
case: Wenzoski v. Central Banking System, Inc..........
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW .....................................
A probationer,who has agreed to be subject to
warrantless searches as a condition of receiving
probation, may be subject to such warrantless
searches even if the search is not based on reasonable
cause: People v. Bravo .................................
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE .....................................
A. W4hen a defendant is convicted of first degree murder
and attempted rape, and the jury is unable to reach a
verdict in the penalty phase of the trial, a retrial
involving the issue of rape and attempted rape does
not prejudice the defendant or place him in double
jeopardy. In addition,during a special circumstance
trial on allegations of murder committed during the
course of rape or attempted rape, evidence of assault
with intent to commit rape of another victim which
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took place shortly before the special circumstance
crime is admissible to prove intent to commit rape in
the special circumstances crime: People v. Ghent ......
B. In a murder trial involving pleas of not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity, it is reversible error
for the trial court to reempanel a jury to decide the
sanity issue when thatjury was released by the court
after the guilt phase of the trial: People v. Hendricks..
C. When a trial court issues conflicting instructions to a
jury regardingattempted murder, stating that
specific intent is required, but falsely instructing that
if implied malice is proven the intent to kill need not
be found, error results which must be tested for
reversal by the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
test: People v. Lee ......................................
D. An information charging a defendant with voluntary
manslaughter,and alleging that the defendant
"willfully," unlawfully, and without malice
aforethought killed his victim, adequately puts a
defendant on notice that he could face a conviction
for involuntary manslaughter: People v. Thomas ......
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A. A superiorcourt judgment enforcing a final order of
the Agriculture Labor Relations Board is appealable:
Agriculture Labor Relations Board v. Tex-Cal Land
M anagement, Inc .......................................
287
B. A state law tort claim based on defamatory remarks
made during disciplinary investigation of an airline
employee is preempted by provisions of the federal
Railway Labor Act which requires resolution of
claims through arbitrationand grievance procedures:
DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc ..........
290
V.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION .................................

Receipt of benefits from the Public Employees'
Retirement System does not prevent recovery of
benefits from workers' compensation. In addition,
city streets are the workplace of city police officers,
and failure by the city to maintain its streets in a
safe condition will not leave the city open to a civil
suit by an injured officer or officer's dependents:
Jones v. Kaiser Industries Corp..........................

292

292

[Vol. 15: 267, 1988]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. A sexual harassmentclaimant who alleges ongoing
emotional distress is vulnerable to a court-orderedmental
examination without the presence of counsel; however,
inquiriesinto the claimant's unrelatedsexual conduct are
permissible only in extraordinarycases: Vinson v. Superior
Court.

In Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 833, 740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 292 (1987), the supreme court considered whether a court-ordered mental examination violated the right to privacy of a plaintiff
who claimed ongoing emotional distress from alleged job-related sexual harassment. The court also examined whether such a plaintiff
had an absolute right to the presence of counsel during the mental
examination. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 2032(a), 2036.1 (West 1983
& Supp. 1987) [hereinafter section 2032(a) and section 2036.1, respectively] (repealed 1987 and replaced by sections 2032(d) and 2017(d),
respectively).
Under section 2032(a), a court may order a mental examination of
a party where the mental or emotional condition is placed in controversy. Section 2036.1 requires a showing of specific, relevant facts to
justify inquiry into a sexual harassment claimant's unrelated sexual
conduct. The Vinson court unanimously agreed that although a defendant has a right to meaningful discovery, the scope should be limited to prevent unjustifiable intrusions into a plaintiff's private life.
The court refused, however, to grant a plaintiff an absolute right to
the presence of counsel during the examination.
In considering the appropriateness of such an examination, the
court evaluated whether the plaintiff's mental state was "in controversy" as required by section 2032(a). By alleging ongoing emotional
distress, the plaintiff effectively placed her mental state in controversy. Compare Cody v. MarriotCorp., 103 F.R.D. 421 (D. Mass. 1984)
(an emotional distress claim does not automatically place the claimant's mental state in controversy). Therefore, where ongoing emotional injuries are alleged, the existence and severity thereof are
discoverable, subject to privacy considerations. See 2 J. HOGAN, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY §§ 8.05-.06 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1987); 23
AM. JUR. 2D Depositions & Discovery §§ 290-292 (1983 & Supp. 1987);
27 CAL. JUR. 3D, pt. 2, Depositions & Discovery § 209 (rev. ed. 1987).
The court then analyzed whether the plaintiff's sexual harassment
suit effected a waiver of her right to privacy, thereby allowing spe-

cific inquiry into her past and current sexual practices. California
considers an individual's right to privacy an "inalienable right." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1. This right has been extended to sexual relations.
E.g., Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210
(1979).
The court determined that the plaintiff partially waived her right
to privacy by alleging continuing mental ailments. However, this
waiver did not extend to sexual practices since the plaintiff did not
allege the sexual harassment was detrimental to her present
sexuality.
The court noted the legislature's intent that such inquiries be permitted only in extraordinary circumstances, so as to avoid unjustifiable intrusions into a claimant's privacy. See Act approved Sept. 30,
1985, ch. 1328, § 1, 1985 Cal. Legis. Serv. 571-72 (West) (codified at
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2036.1 (West Supp. 1987)). Under section
2036.1, a higher standard of "good cause" must be met before discovery into sexual conduct will be allowed. Since the defendant failed to
show specific facts justifying the sex-related questions, the inquiry
was not permissible.
Finally, the court reviewed whether the plaintiff had an absolute
right to the presence of counsel during the examination. In revising
section 2032(a), the legislature indicated that existing case law should
not be disturbed. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2032(d) (West Supp.
1987) [hereinafter section 2032(d)]. Consequently, the court refused
to alter its decision in Edwards v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 905, 549
P.2d 846, 130 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), which held that no such absolute
right exists.
The court stressed that the presence of counsel would negate the
examination's value by adversely impacting the rapport between the
interviewer and the examinee. Sufficient protective devices were
deemed to exist under current procedural rules, including the right
to audio-tape the examination under section 2032(d). See 2 J. HOGAN,
MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY § 8.11 (3d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1986); 2
B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 1550 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1987);
23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions & Discovery §§ 305-306 (1983 & Supp.
1987); 27 CAL. JUR. 3D, pt. 2, Depositions & Discovery § 215 (rev. ed.
1987).
However, consistent with recent federal decisions, the court acknowledged a trial court's discretion to allow the presence of counsel
or impose other protective measures when abusive discovery tactics
are evident. See, e.g., Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 585 F. Supp. 635
(E.D. Wis. 1984); Lowe v. PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc., 101 F.R.D.
296 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
Thus, the court has refused to substantially restrict a defendant's
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right to conduct a meaningful investigation of a sexual harassment
claimant's alleged emotional injuries. Where the claimant places her
mental condition in controversy by alleging ongoing emotional distress, she is vulnerable to a court-ordered mental examination. The
claimant's right to privacy is only partially waived. Thus, a prohibition on inquiries into unrelated sexual conduct is justified absent a
specific showing of good cause to the contrary. Finally, where there
are indicia of discovery abuses, the trial court may impose further
protective measures, including attendance by the claimant's counsel.
See generally 2 J. HOGAN, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY §§ 8.04.15 (3d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1986); 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE
§§ 1542-1552 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1987); 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions
& Discovery §§ 282-306 (1983 & Supp. 1987); 27 CAL. JUR. 3D, pt. 2,
Depositions & Discovery §§ 214-217 (rev. ed. 1987).
BARBARA

A.

BAYLISS

B. A motion for a new trial made subsequent to the trial
court's grantinga dismissal, but prior to the actual
entry of judgment, is deemed to be timely filed, and
the grantingor denial of the motion for new trial by
the trial court extinguishes its jurisdictionover the
case: Wenzoski v. Central Banking System, Inc.
In Wenzoski v. Central Banking System, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 539, 736
P.2d 753, 237 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1987), the California Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had
not filed the notice of appeal within the thirty-day time period prescribed by rule 3(a) of the California Rules of Court. The plaintiffs'
civil suit against Central Banking had been dismissed upon a motion
brought by the defendants. The dismissal was granted on December
19, 1980, but a judgment of dismissal was not recorded until January
2, 1981. The plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial on December 31,
1980, prior to the actual entering of judgment. Upon discovering this
fact, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for new trial on January 16,
1981. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' first motion on January
20, 1981, and denied the second motion on February 26, 1981. The
plaintiffs, wishing to contest the denial of a new trial, filed a notice of
appeal on March 20, 1981.
The supreme court held that the notice of appeal was not timely
filed because more than thirty days had elapsed between the denial
of the first motion, on January 20, and the filing of the notice of ap-

peal, on March 20. Although the notice of appeal was filed within
thirty days of the denial of the second motion, the court concluded
that the trial court had extinguished its jurisdiction over the case after it had denied the first motion for new trial. Therefore, it could
not properly consider the second motion. The court emphasized that
once a trial court rules on a motion for new trial, the trial court exhausts its jurisdiction over the case and can amend its decision only if
it is attempting to correct a clerical error or inadvertence. See 8 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attack on Judgment in Trial Court
§ 129(b) (3d ed. 1985).
In a supplemental brief filed with the supreme court, the plaintiffs
attempted to assert that they were correcting a clerical error by filing
the second motion. However, the plaintiffs had not propounded this
theory at any time prior to the filing of the supplemental brief. The
supreme court felt the only reason the plaintiffs filed a second motion was fear that the first motion was filed in an untimely fashion.
The plaintiffs had never claimed to the trial court that the second
motion was filed because of a clerical error in the first motion. The
court pointed to case law which expressed that a motion for new trial
filed under circumstances similar to the plaintiffs' would be considered timely. See 47 CAL. JUR. 3D New Trial §§ 74-78 (1979).
The supreme court rendered the only decision it was capable of
rendering under the facts presented: The thirty-day time period began to run when the trial court denied the first motion for new trial.
Therefore, the final day to file a notice of appeal would have been
February 20, 1981. The fact that the trial court went on to deny the
second motion is moot. The trial court no longer had jurisdiction
over the case. The trial court ruling on the second motion was not at
all persuasive to the supreme court, nor should it have been. Once a
trial court relinquishes its jurisdiction, it cannot be reclaimed. Subsequent, improper action by a trial court will not bring the case back
under its jurisdiction.
This case makes evident two salient points which should be of
great importance to any litigating attorney: (1) a motion for new trial
filed after an order granting dismissal, but prior to a judgment is considered to be timely filed; and (2) after a trial court rules on a motion
for new trial, it extinguishes its jurisdiction over the case and the
thirty-day time period for filing notice of appeal begins to run.
MARK J. STUMP
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II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A probationer,who has agreed to be subject to warrantless
searches as a condition of receiving probation, may be
subject to such warrantlesssearches even if the search is
not based on reasonablecause: People v. Bravo.

In People v. Bravo, 43 Cal. 3d 600, 738 P.2d 336, 238 Cal. Rptr. 282
(1987), the California Supreme Court held that an individual who has
waived his constitutional rights to be free from warrantless searches,
as a condition to receiving probation, shall be subject to searches
even when the law enforcement agency conducting the search does
not have reasonable cause to do so. The court emphasized that this
ruling does not permit law enforcement personnel to conduct
searches of a probationer's person or property for the purpose of
harassing the individual, nor does it allow "arbitrary or capricious"
searches.
The appellant in Bravo had been convicted of possessing marijuana. He was granted probation after agreeing to waive his rights to
be free from warrantless searches at any time of the day or night.
While on probation, a warrantless search of the appellant's premises
revealed cocaine and illicit firearms leading to his arrest. The appellant plead guilty to the charges against him. Following the judgment,
he appealed the case.
On appeal, the appellant maintained that the search of his apartment and subsequent seizure of the illicit property was unlawful because of the police officers' lack of reasonable cause to conduct the
search. He did not claim that the police officers could not conduct a
warrantless search. Rather, he insisted that in spite of the probationary conditions applicable to him regarding searches, the officers must
have reasonable cause to institute a search.
The court of appeal overturned the judgment on the grounds that
the appellant's waiver of his constitutional protection against warrantless searches did not subject him to unreasonable searches. The
court viewed a search based on an unconfirmed tip, as the appellant's
search was, as an unreasonable search. The court of appeal reached
this decision by applying the same strict scrutiny test to the search
waiver as would be applied to any other advance waiver of fundamental rights.
The supreme court rejected the application of a strict scrutiny test
to the waiver of protection against warrantless searches. The court
reasoned that fourth amendment rights were significantly different

from other fundamental rights. The court concluded that the proper
test for determining the validity of a waiver of fourth amendment
rights should be an objective test. If the individual waiving his fourth
amendment rights does so in a manner which signifies a reasonable
understanding of the implications of the waiver, then the objective
test has been met. Here, the court believed that the appellant had a
reasonable understanding of the waiver because the specific wording
of the consent agreement validated the warrantless search even without reasonable cause.
The supreme court acted reasonably in reversing the court of appeal's decision. By allowing the appellant to voluntarily waive his
fourth amendment rights in order to stay out of jail, the purposes of
the probation scheme were effectively met. The probationer is deterred from committing additional crimes, and the law enforcement
agencies are provided with an appropriate means to determine
whether the probationer is following the conditions of his probation.
The specific language of the waiver made it clear that the appellant
did not have to agree to the consent, but was only obligated to the
conditions of the waiver if the agreement was voluntarily entered
into. At the point of time when the appellant agreed to the waiver,
his only protection from searches was a shielding from searches
which were arbitrary, capricious, or intended to harass. The search
in the present case, while possibly lacking reasonable cause, did not
deny the appellant any rights he had not already relinquished.
MARK

J. STUMP
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III.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A.

When a defendant is convicted of first degree murder and
attempted rape, and the jury is unable to reach a verdict
in the penalty phase of the trial, a retrial involving the
issue of rape and attempted rape does not prejudice the
defendant or place him in double jeopardy. In addition,
during a special circumstance trial on allegations of
murder committed during the course of rape or attempted
rape, evidence of assault with intent to commit rape of
another victim which took place shortly before the special
circumstance crime is admissible to prove intent to
commit rape in the special circumstances crime: People v.
Ghent.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Ghent,1 the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder and attempted rape of one victim and assault with intent to
commit rape of another victim. The jury deadlocked on the issue of
special circumstances. 2 A subsequent jury agreed that special circumstances existed and returned a sentence of death.3 The instant
4
appeal was automatic.
II.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On February 21, 1978, Ghent proceeded into the bedroom of a female housemate and attempted to force her to engage in sexual relations. When the housemate's child entered the room, Ghent gave up
the attack and left the house. 5 A short time later, Ghent went to the
home of his friends, Paul and Patricia Bert. Paul was not at home.
Patricia, dressed only in a robe, was there and she engaged in conversation with Ghent. During this time, Ghent observed Patricia's robe
1. 43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1987). The majority opinion
was written by Chief Justice Lucas, with Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson, and Kaufman
concurring. Justice Mosk and Justice Broussard each wrote a separate concurring
opinion.
2. In order to sentence an individual to death, a jury must find special circumstances are involved--one of which is that the murder was committed while the defendant was committing or attempting to commit rape. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(17)(iii) (West Supp. 1987).
3. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 748, 739 P.2d at 1255, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239 (West Supp. 1987).
5. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 748-49, 739 P.2d at 1255-56, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 88.

fall open, revealing her nude body. According to Ghent, the next
thing he could remember was standing over Patricia's dead body.6
Ghent remembered holding a bloody knife in his hand and seeing Patricia's hands tied behind her back. Ghent claimed he then left the
house only to return shortly thereafter to remove his fingerprints
from the premises. Ghent was subsequently arrested.
III.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Guilt Phase Issues

The defendant had numerous contentions on appeal regarding both
the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The defendant's first contention was that his Miranda rights were violated when a police officer and a psychiatrist, employed by the police department,
continued questioning him after he had requested the assistance of
7
an attorney.
The supreme court agreed that any questions posed subsequent to a
request for counsel do violate a defendant's Miranda rights. Nevertheless, the court held that the questioning and resulting testimony
constituted harmless error because the testimony merely indicated
premeditation and there was overwhelming evidence to show that a
felony murder had occurred while the defendant attempted to rape
his victim.8
The defendant also claimed that the exclusion for cause of jurors
who were automatically opposed to the death penalty denied him a
jury which represented a cross-section of the community.9 The
supreme court rejected this claim out of hand, relying on prior case
precedent.10
The defendant argued next that the People had failed to properly
preserve a semen sample so that the defense could conduct its own
tests.1 1 The court held that proper care had been exercised and that
if any deterioration had occurred to the sample inhibiting defense
6. Id. at 749, 739 P.2d at 1256, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 88. Ghent testified that he must
have raped Bert as soon as he saw her nude body. The prosecution believed that
Ghent left the house and then returned later to rape and murder Mrs. Bert.
7. Id. at 750, 739 P.2d at 1256, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 89. The defendant indicated several times that he wished to talk to an attorney. Despite his requests, the interrogation continued with questions from police officers and a police psychiatrist.
8. Id. at 752, 739 P.2d at 1258, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
9. Id. at 753, 739 P.2d at 1259, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
10. Id. at 753-54, 739 P.2d at 1259, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 91. The court relied on its decision in People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1983).
11. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 754, 739 P.2d at 1259, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 91. A semen sample
was obtained during a vaginal wash of Mrs. Bert's body. During the subsequent tests,
the sample was frozen by the police and was then sent to the defense laboratory where
it sat on a desk for three to four days. The court admitted that the sample may have
been damaged, but the damage was not the fault of the police. Id. See People v. Nation, 26 Cal. 3d 169, 604 P.2d 1051, 161 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1980).
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12
tests, it was the fault of the defense rather than the People.
The defendant also argued that his counsel was incompetent in the
first trial because counsel had failed to furnish a defense psychiatrist
with the defendant's complete records involving prior sex offenses.
However, the court found that the first trial involved the murder
charge and that the psychiatrist was fully prepared for a murder defense. 13 The prior sex offense information was only pertinent to the
second trial which concerned special circumstances.14 The court
found the psychiatrist was fully prepared in the second trial and had
been provided all of the relevant information regarding prior sex of15
fenses by defense counsel.
The defendant then argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury at the first trial about lesser-included offenses of
rape as they pertained to the assault on Patricia Bert. The supreme
court saw no use in this advisement as defendant did not specifically
deny the crime, but merely claimed a loss of memory as to when the
rape occurred. 16 The supreme court found that the defendant was
guilty of rape, attempted rape, or was not guilty, and that collateral
17
issues involving lesser offenses were useless to the defendant's case.
The defendant also claimed the trial court erred in not cautioning
the jury more fully regarding the taking of notes. The supreme court
agreed that the admonitions given probably could have been more inclusive, but found that the overwhelming evidence of defendant's
guilt outweighed the incomplete admonitions.' 8
Prior to trial, the defendant had moved to have the charges resulting from his assault on his housemate severed from the charges involving the murder and rape of Bert.19 This issue had been appealed

12. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 755-56, 739 P.2d at 1260, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
13. Id. at 756, 739 P.2d at 1261, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 93. The court determined that the
evidence of prior sex offenses was only relevant to the special circumstances issue because it involved the issue of premeditation. The first trial involved the murder charge
alone, and thus evidence regarding premeditation of rape was irrelevant.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 757, 739 P.2d at 1261, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 93. The court agreed that a trial
court must give instructions on relevant legal issues if it is necessary for the jury to get
a clear understanding of the case. However, when there-is no evidence that the offense is less than that which has been charged, then the instructions need not be given.
Id. See People v. Noah, 5 Cal. 3d 469, 487 P.2d 1009, 96 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1971). Since
Ghent did not deny the rape or attempted rape, the offense could not have been less
than what was charged.
17. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 757, 739 P.2d at 1261, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
18. Id. at 758, 739 P.2d at 1262, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
19. Id.

previously and denied. 20 The supreme court upheld the denial, holding that evidence of the first assault would have been admissible in
any event in order to show defendant's motive for attacking Bert.2 1
Thus, there was no need to sever the charge.
B. Special Circumstances Contentions
1.

Double Jeopardy Violation

At his first trial, the defendant was convicted of murder, attempted
rape, and assault with intent to commit rape. The first jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the special circumstances issue
and a second jury was empaneled to resolve the conflict.
The second jury was informed that the defendant had already been
found guilty of murder, but with permission from the People and the
defense, the jury was not informed that the defendant had also been
found guilty of attempted rape. 22 The second jury then heard evidence and redecided the rape/attempted rape issue as a component of
the special circumstances issue.
The defendant asserted that this put him in double-jeopardy because he had already been found guilty of rape. The supreme court
disagreed, stating that section 190.4 of the Penal Code 23 did not require any relitigation of the rape issue and that the defendant actually received a free, undeserved additional shot to exonerate himself
24
of the attempted rape conviction.
2.

Prosecutor's Misconduct

The defendant alleged that the prosecutor improperly attacked the
defense counsel's honesty when he attempted to impeach the defense
psychiatrist. The prosecutor tried to show that the defendant was
not capable of forming his defense without having heard an explanation of the law from defense counsel. 25 The supreme court did not
accept the contention that this line of questioning attacked the honesty of the defense counsel.26 The court also held that the failure of
20. Ghent v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 944, 153 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1979).
21. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 759, 739 P.2d at 1263, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 95. The court found
evidence of the first assault to be highly probative of the defendant's premeditation of

the subsequent crimes. Premeditation was a central issue in the special circumstance
segment of the trial.
22. Id. at 760, 739 P.2d at 1263, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
23. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4 (West 1970).
24. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 761, 739 P.2d at 1264, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 96. Section 190.4
stated that when a jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on special circumstances, a new jury shall be empaneled, but the new jury shall not try the issues of
guilt found by the first jury. Therefore, Ghent was not in double-jeopardy but actually

received a bonus trial.
25. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 761, 739 P.2d at 1263, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
26. Id. at 762, 739 P.2d at 1264, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 97. The court interpreted the
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defense counsel to ask for an admonition from the judge effectively
27
waived any objections to the questions posed.
C. Penalty Phase Contentions
1.

Juror Dismissal

The defendant alleged that the trial court erred in excluding certain jurors in the penalty phase due to their view on the death penalty. The defendant argued that in order for jurors to be excused,
they would have to unequivocally state that they would vote against
the death penalty no matter what evidence was produced at trial.
The supreme court rejected the defendant's contentions and, relying
on Wainwright v. Witt,28 stated that a juror's bias need not be made
unmistakably clear.29 The court went on to state that even if the juror's dismissal was examined under the old test set forth in Wither31
spoon v. Illinois,30 the trial court had exercised proper restraint.
The court held that Witt now takes precedent over Witherspoon in
California and, therefore, a trial court's decision to excuse a juror
must have deference even when that juror has not expressly stated
32
that he would vote against the death penalty.

The supreme court went on to deny numerous other defense allegations of impropriety during the penalty phase. The court held that
the prosecutor's brief mention of a Governor's power to commute a
death sentence during voir dire did not constitute reversible error, especially because of the defense counsel's failure to ask for an
33
admonition.
The supreme court also denied the defendant's contention that a
prosecutor's brief reference to the deterrent effect of the death penalty was reversible error. While the court observed that discussion of
the deterrent effect of the death penalty should be left out of closing
arguments, the court did not find that it had a harmful effect in the
prosecutor's line of questioning as merely trying to ascertain whether the defendant
had the mental capabilities to form his defense without the help from his counsel.
27. Id See People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
28. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
29. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 767, 739 P.2d at 1268, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
30. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
31. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d at 767, 739 P.2d at 1268, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 100. The court
thought Witt made good sense because a judge can often form a view of a juror's true
feelings despite the fact that the feelings have not been expressly stated.
32. Id. at 767, 739 P.2d at 1268, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
33. Id. at 769, 739 P.2d at 1269, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.

present case. 34
The court also rejected the defendant's claim that the prosecutor's
statements regarding lack of remorse violated his privilege against
self-incrimination. The court held first that the statements did not
violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination because
the prosecutor did not directly refer to the defendant's failure to testify.3 5 In fact, the defendant did take the stand in his defense. Further, the court held that the issue of remorse is valid in a jury's
36
deliberation of the death penalty.
The court rejected the defendant's claim that the prosecutor's mention of his age as an aggravating factor constituted misconduct. The
court held that age alone could not be considered an aggravating factor, but it could be used to show maturity and sophistication. Therefore, the defendant was not deserving of mercy even though a young,
immature person might be so deserving. 37
Finally, the defendant argued that the California death penalty
provision was invalid under international law. The court, while acknowledging that international resolutions can certainly influence
legislation, decided that it was up to the legislature to decide how
much deference to give to such resolutions.3 8 The court reaffirmed
the constitutionality of the California death penalty law and rejected
the defendant's arguments. 39 The court then affirmed the trial
40
court's decision to sentence the defendant to death.
IV.
A.

THE SEPARATE OPINIONS

Justice Mosk's ConcurringOpinion

Justice Mosk concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to
note two reservations. First, Mosk believed the issue of age may always be mentioned by the prosecutor and the defense counsel would
then have an opportunity to argue against its use. The jury could
then attach as much relevance to the age issue as it deemed
necessary.

41

Justice Mosk was also disturbed by the casual treatment the major34. Id. at 771, 739 P.2d at 1270-71, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 775, 739 P.2d at 1273-74, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
37. Id. at 778, 739 P.2d at 1276, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 108. The court felt that the prosecutor merely introduced the defendant's age in order to argue the inapplicability of a
mitigating factor. The court seemed to feel that, in general, age should not be admitted as an aggravating factor.
38. Id. at 778, 739 P.2d at 1276, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
39. Id. at 780, 739 P.2d at 1277, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 781, 739 P.2d at 1277, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (Mosk, J., concurring).
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ity gave the issue of international law.42 Although he believed more

deference must be given to international law, Justice Mosk did not
believe it required elimination of the death penalty.43

B. Justice Broussard'sConcurring Opinion
While agreeing with the judgment, Justice Broussard wrote separately to state his belief that a prosecutor cannot use the absence of
mitigating factors as a positive aggravating factor.44 The prosecutor,
during the penalty phase argument, had advised the jury that there
was no evidence to support certain mitigating factors and, therefore,
an aggravating factor resulted. Broussard strongly disagreed with
this reasoning and felt that it could be highly prejudicial to jury
members. However, in the present case, the prosecutor made only
one passing reference to this rationale, and thus Justice Broussard
45
did not consider the error to be reversible.

V.

CONCLUSION

There were numerous errors committed in Ghent's trial, both at
the guilt phase and the penalty phase. The court, while acknowledging the existence of many of the errors, declined to find any of the
discrepancies worthy of reversal of the conviction or sentence. This
case may be indicative of the manner in which death penalty cases
will be reviewed in the coming years. The Bird court 46 was very lenient in finding that certain errors warranted reversal. This case
shows that the Lucas court may be more tolerant of prosecutorial indiscretions and defense counsel errors when the evidence in the case
is so overwhelmingly against the defendant.
MARK J. STUMP

42. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
43. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 781, 739 P.2d at 1278, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (Broussard, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 783, 739 P.2d at 1279, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11 (Broussard, J., concurring).
46. Ghent was the first death penalty case upheld by the supreme court since Justice Lucas became the Chief Justice in January of 1987. Former Chief Justice Bird,
along with Justice Reynoso and Justice Grodin, were voted out of the supreme court in
November 1986. One of the principal attacks on the three Justices was their unwillingness to uphold death penalty sentences.

B. In a murder trial involving pleas of not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity, it is reversible error
for the trial court to reempanel a jury to decide the
sanity issue when thatjury was released by the court
after the guilt phase of the trial: People v. Hendricks.
In People v. Hendricks, 43 Cal. 3d 584, 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal. Rptr.
66 (1987), the supreme court held that when a defendant pleaded not
guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, and was convicted of murder by a jury which was released by the court immediately thereafter, later reconvening of the same jury to hear the sanity phase of the
trial constituted reversible error. This holding applies even when, as
in this case, the jury was not properly discharged.
The case was reviewed by the supreme court as an automatic appeal from a judgment of death as required by California law. See
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1-.9 and 1239(b) (West Supp. 1987); see generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3269-3272 (rev. ed. 1985).
Charged with the murder and robbery of two people, the defendant
pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. After convicting the defendant on all counts, the jury also found three types of
special circumstances present: 1) prior murder convictions (for
murders that occurred after the murders in the instant case), 2) multiple murders in this case, and 3) felony murder due to the robberies.
The jury, after setting the penalty at death, was discharged by the
court.
When the time came for sentencing, the court was reminded that it
had failed to conduct a separate sanity hearing immediately after the
guilt phase of the trial as mandated by section 190.1(c) of the Penal
Code. The court then empaneled a new jury to decide sanity, despite
the defendant's insistence that the same jury must decide all issues
for a case involving a capital offense. The second jury was unable to
reach a decision after extensive deliberations, resulting in a mistrial.
Finally, the court reconvened the original jury-after a lapse of
over five months-and ordered them to decide the defendant's sanity.
The jurors found him to be sane at the time of the murders, and the
court once again invoked the death penalty.
Several other issues were also decided by the supreme court. The
defendant raised three objections regarding his own guilt: his confession was involuntary and should not have been admitted; his defense
was so inadequate as to be tantamount to a guilty plea, thus requiring
express waiver of his rights; and the court wrongly admitted photographs that were prejudicial to his case. The court determined that
these objections were either without merit or constituted harmless
error.
The defendant also contended that the special circumstances
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should not apply with regard to the prior murder convictions because those murders took place after the murders in the case at bar.
The court quickly dispensed with this argument, explaining that the
relevant factor was the order of the convictions, not the order of the
crimes. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
Finally, the defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error by releasing and reconvening the original jury more
than five months later for the sanity hearing. The supreme court
agreed with this charge of error. The trial court is without jurisdiction to reconvene a jury once that jury has rendered a complete verdict and/or the court loses control over those jurors. The court went
on to explain that this rule rests on two primary bases: First, the
rule has the effect of protecting a completed verdict. It prevents reconsideration or alteration of that verdict. Second, it guarantees a
fair trial by preventing contamination of the jury by outside influences. Once the jury is released by the court, jurors are free to discuss the case with others, answer questions related to the case,
examine media coverage, and engage in other activities that may not
be desirable during the trial. While the jury is empaneled, the court
maintains control over it. However, once a jury leaves the jury box,
the trial court effectively loses control over the jurors and has no jurisdiction to reconvene it. This holds true regardless of whether the
release can be labeled a "discharge."
Because of the trial court's error in reempaneling the jury, the
supreme court vacated the sanity verdict and reversed the death
sentence.
BRUCE MONROE

C.

When a trial court issues conflicting instructions to a
jury regardingattempted murder, stating that specific
intent is required, but falsely instructing that if
implied malice is proven the intent to kill need not be
found, error results which must be tested for reversal
by the harnless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubttest: People
v. Lee.

In People v. Lee, 43 Cal. 3d 666, 738 P.2d 752, 238 Cal. Rptr. 406
(1987), the California Supreme Court decided that error was committed when a trial court issued conflicting instructions to a jury regarding whether an intent to kill finding was needed to convict an
individual of attempted murder. The trial court instructed the jury

that in order to find the defendant guilty of attempted murder, they
must find that the defendant had the specific intent to kill the victim.
In addition, the jury was instructed that if it found that the defendant acted with implied malice, it would not be necessary to determine
if the defendant actually intended to kill the victim. See 17 CAL. JUR.
3D, pt. 1, Criminal Law § 124 (rev. ed. 1984). While the supreme
court found these conflicting instructions to be error, it decided the
error was harmless and did not warrant a reversal of the jury's guilty
verdict.
In Lee, the defendant was charged with the attempted murder of a
police officer. The attempted killing took place while the defendant
was fleeing from two approaching officers. When the officers came
within fifteen to twenty feet of the defendant, he turned and fired
one round from an automatic pistol. The pistol then jammed and the
defendant was unable to fire additional rounds. The defendant was
subsequently arrested by the two officers. At trial he was found
guilty of attempted murder. The conviction was appealed due to the
conflicting jury instructions.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's conviction. While
the appellate court did find the divergent jury instructions to be error, it decided the error was not prejudicial and, therefore, the conviction should stand.
The supreme court embraced the reasoning of the lower court and
affirmed the decision. The supreme court agreed that the instructions constituted harmless error. The court held that any time a trial
court gives conflicting instructions regarding the requisite intent
needed for attempted murder, the harmless-beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard should be utilized to test the severity of the error.
See Chapman v. California,386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967). Although the jury
instructions were incorrect, the supreme court reasoned that there
were enough other factors present to hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The supreme court was satisfied that the jury had received ample
evidence to determine the defendant had the requisite intent to kill.
In addition, the court found that the incorrect implied malice instructions were given only during the jury instructions. The trial court
had properly charged the jury at least three times during the trial
that a conviction of attempted murder required a determination that
the defendant intended to kill the police officer. Also, both the district attorney and the defense attorney addressed the requirement of
finding intent in order to hand down an attempted murder conviction
in their closing arguments. In the eyes of the supreme court, the jury
was most likely under the impression that they had to find both intent and malice in order to convict the defendant of attempted mur-
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der. Thus, even though conflicting instructions were given, the
resulting error was harmless.
The supreme court was heavily influenced by the facts of this case.
The defendant fired his weapon at the police officers from a distance
of fifteen to twenty feet. This evidence made the defendant's actual
intent at the time of the shooting apparent. Even with the conflicting instructions, the supreme court simply did not believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error was harmful.
MARK J. STUMP

D. An information charging a defendant with voluntary
manslaughter,and alleging that the defendant
"willfully," unlawfully, and without malice
aforethought killed his victim, adequatelyputs a
defendant on notice that he could face a conviction
for involuntary manslaughter: People v. Thomas
In People v. Thomas, 43 Cal. 3d 818, 740 P.2d 419, 239 Cal. Rptr. 307
(1987), the issue addressed was whether the defendant's due process
rights were violated when he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter (former CAL. PENAL CODE § 192.2, subsequently renumbered 192(a)) under an information which charged him with a
violation of "Section 192.1" of the Penal Code (the voluntary manslaughter section) and alleged that he had "willfully," unlawfully,
and without malice aforethought killed his victim. The supreme
court concluded that the information made out a general charge of
manslaughter despite its explicit reference to "section 192.1." This
reference was not considered prejudicial to the defendant and thus
no due process violation was found.
The defendant was involved in a scuffle with the victim, Tommy
Myers. Myers had allegedly raped the mother of the defendant's son.
During the struggle, one shot was fired into the air. Another shot,
fired at close range, hit Myers in the stomach. The defendant alleged
that the shooting was accidental.
Both the prosecutor and the defense counsel submitted instructions
on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. However, in chambers,
counsel for the defense withdrew his request for involuntary manslaughter instructions without objecting to the prosecution's request.
The court prefaced its discussion with the recognition that due process mandates an accused be notified of the charges against him so
that he may prepare his defense appropriately. See People v.

Lohbauer, 29 Cal. 3d 364, 368, 627 P.2d 183, 184, 173 Cal. Rptr. 453, 454
(1981); People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 612, 477 P.2d 409, 419, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 395 (1970). The court went on to acknowledge that an adequate accusatory pleading does not have to specifically state by
number the statute that the accused is being charged under. People
v. Schueren, 10 Cal. 3d 553, 558, 516 P.2d 833, 836, 111 Cal. Rptr. 129,
132 (1973); People v. Deas, 27 Cal. App. 3d 860, 863, 104 Cal. Rptr. 250,
252 (1972). The allegations of the pleading describe which offenses
will be put into the charge. People v. Marshall, 48 Cal. 2d 394, 404,
309 P.2d 456, 463 (1957); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 188 (Supp. I 1985); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 2744 (rev.
ed. 1985). Therefore, it was inconsequential that the information had
only specified the Penal Code section dealing with voluntary
manslaughter.
The court then analyzed the import of the actual words of the allegation and concluded that, except for the word "willfully" being included, the information alleged an unlawful killing of a human
without malice. The word "willfully" did not limit the crime charged
to an intentional homicide since it implied a willingness to commit
the crime. 21 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 2746 (rev. ed. 1985).
Furthermore, the court found that the defendant had failed to
show any prejudice resulted from the wording of the information.
His counsel initially requested instructions on involuntary manslaughter, so he could hardly claim that he lacked notice. His counsel
had actually made a decision not to object to the prosecution's instructions. This decision showed that his request to withdraw the instruction was a tactical decision. Lastly, the record of the
preliminary examination indicated that the defendant should have
been on notice that he faced a conviction for involuntary
manslaughter.
As a final note, the court overruled People v. Bergman, 154 Cal.
App. 3d 30, 201 Cal. Rptr. 54 (1984), to the extent that it was inconsistent with its decision in Thomas. In Bergman, the defendant had notice from the actual language of the pleading despite the statutory
specification. Thus, the crucial question in Bergman should have
been whether the defendant was misled so as to prejudice him. He
was not prejudiced since the court believed that he would not have
prepared for his defense differently.
In conclusion, this opinion does not present any radical departure
from precedent. On the contrary, it represents an endorsement of
legal theories and conclusions that have been expressed for years.
Essentially, the court has laid out a two-part test to determine when
a defendant's due process rights have been violated by lack of notice
from an accusatory pleading. The defendant must show that the lan-
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guage of the information was either incorrect or unclear and that this
error prejudiced him in that he was not able to prepare his defense
appropriately.
STAFF

Iv.

LABOR LAW
A. A superiorcourt judgment enforcing a final order of the
Agriculture Labor Relations Board is appealable:
Agriculture Labor Relations Board v. Tex-Cal Land
Management, Inc.

In Agriculture Labor Relations Board v. Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 696, 739 P.2d 140, 238 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1987), the
supreme court held that a superior court enforcement order of a final
Agriculture Labor Relations Board [hereinafter ALRB or Board] order, entered pursuant to section 1160.8 of the California Labor Code,
may be appealed. The court also found that such enforcement orders
are subject to the appellate-stay provisions of Part 2 (sections 916936.1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In 1982, the ALRB found that appellant Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. [hereinafter Tex-Cal] had violated the Agriculture Labor
Relations Act of 1975 [hereinafter ALRA] (sections 1140-1166.3 of the
California Labor Code) by hiring out work to a contractor without
negotiating with the employee representative, and by discharging employees who protested working conditions. The ALRB therefore ordered Tex-Cal to cease and desist from further unilateral
modification of working conditions, to cease and desist from the discriminatory discharges, and to reinstate terminated employees, with
reimbursement for economic loss.
After the order became final (Tex-Cal obtained dismissal of its own
petition for review by the court of appeal), the ALRB requested and
received a superior court judgment to enforce Tex-Cal's compliance
therewith. When Tex-Cal appealed the superior court judgment
shortly after its issuance, the ALRB moved to dismiss the appeal,
contending that this type of judgment was not appealable.
The ALRB had already petitioned the superior court for a contempt hearing based on Tex-Cal's alleged continuing refusal to comply with its order. Based on its position that the Board's order was
stayed pending appeal, the court declined to hold Tex-Cal in
contempt.

The Board then sought writ of mandate from the court of appeal,
which combined judgment on the writ with judgment on the appeal.
The court denied the ALRB's motion to dismiss the appeal, affirmed
superior court enforcement of the order, and partially granted the
writ of mandate, holding that some parts of the enforcement order
were not stayed pending appeal.
In affirming the court of appeal, the supreme court dealt with both
of the ALRB's arguments against allowing appeal of the superior
court judgment. First to be considered was the Board's assertion that
a superior court judgment was not appealable because it was not a final judgment as required by section 904.1 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure.
The court found the Board's reliance upon Gue v. Dennis, 28 Cal.
2d 616, 170 P.2d 887 (1946), to be misplaced. Gue dealt with enforcement of investigatory subpoenas issued by the Labor Commissioner.
A superior court enforcement order under section 93 of the Labor
Code was held to be intermediate in nature, since that section "has as
its objective an adjudication in contempt if noncompliance persists."
Tex-Cal, 43 Cal. 3d at 703, 739 P.2d at 143, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 783 (quoting Gue, 28 Cal. 2d at 617, 170 P.2d at 887). The Cue court went on to
state that "an order directing compliance, which expressly contemplates a further order, is intermediate in character, and any review
thereof should await a subsequent adjudication in contempt." Id.
(quoting Cue, 28 Cal. 2d at 617, 170 P.2d at 887) (italics added by the
Tex-Cal court). Since the ALRB order in this case had no such statement of further adjudication in contempt, the court found that ue
did not apply.
The ALRB's other argument against appealability focused on a
provision in section 1160.9 of the California Labor Code, which made
the procedures delineated in section 1160.8 "the exclusive method of
redressing unfair labor practices." The Board contended that this expression of exclusivity evinced legislative intent that a superior court
enforcement order be final and not subject to appeal. Allowing appeal in this situation, according to the Board, would frustrate one of
the legislature's purposes in enacting the ALRA-namely, the desire
for speedy and efficient enforcement of ALRB orders that have become final on the merits.
Here also, the court found the Board's reasoning unpersuasive.
The majority indicated that absent express provision to the contrary
in section 1160.8, there was no reason to consider the exclusive remedies therein to be an exception to the general rule of appealability,
legislative intentions of speedy enforcement notwithstanding.
In asserting the appealability of superior court judgments enforcing
ALRB orders, a closely divided supreme court expressly disapproved
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statements to the contrary in Agriculture Labor Relations Board v.
Abatti Produce, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 3d 504, 214 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1985).
The Abatti court had endorsed a broader interpretation of Gue, as
well as a view of the "exclusive method" language of Labor Code section 1160.9 that was more in harmony with the ALRB's perspective.
The other question decided by the court in this case was whether
the superior court's order was stayed pending appeal. In refusing to
find Tex-Cal in contempt, the superior court held that its judgment
enforcing the Board's order was automatically and completely stayed.
The court of appeal, on the other hand, found that parts (those involving mandatory injunctive relief) of the judgment were stayed,
while the Board, naturally, argued that no part of the judgment
should be stayed.
The majority disagreed with the Board's contention that the appellate-stay provisions of Part 2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure did not apply because Labor Code section 1160.8's enforcement
procedure is a "special procedure." The court had previously held
that Part 2 applied only to civil "actions" and not to "special proceedings." Here the court saw no reason to consider ALRB order enforcement anything other than a type of "action."
A concise, but effective dissenting opinion, penned by Justice
Broussard and joined by Justices Mosk and Arguelles, criticized the
majority as adopting too narrow a reading of Gue. The dissent would
have affirmed Abatti and held Gue controlling in the instant case.
Justice Broussard also pointed out an anomalous result of the majority's holding. The procedure outlined in section 1160.8 permits a
noncomplying recipient of an ALRB order to delay compliance by
gaining "risk free" appellate review of superior court enforcement
judgments, and avoiding the statute's specifically authorized method
of review by the court of appeal.
In conclusion, in Tex-Cal the supreme court has authorized appeal
of a superior court's enforcement of ALRB orders. Unfortunately, by
adopting a narrow interpretation of Gue v. Dennis, a majority of the
court has put a significant damper on an important purpose of the
legislature in enacting the Agricultural Labor Relations Act-effecting rapid resolution of agricultural labor disputes. Recalcitrant employers may now prolong their noncompliance with Board orders by
exercising an unnecessary appeal procedure with the result that jus-

tice in some cases will be unjustly delayed for those who need it
most: the employees.
BRUCE MONROE

B. A state law tort claim based on defamatory remarks
made during disciplinary investigation of an airline
employee is preempted by provisions of the federal
Railway Labor Act which requires resolution of
claims through arbitrationand grievance procedures:
DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
In DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 517,
733 P.2d 614, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987), the California Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff's tort claims under state law were preempted
by applicable sections of the Railway Labor Act [hereinafter RLA].
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). The court found that the RLA required
the claim to be resolved through arbitration or grievance procedures
because the offensive conduct upon which the claim was based occurred in the course of disciplinary proceedings validly instituted by
an airline/employer. See generally 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Labor § 206
(1978); 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Agency and Employment §§ 438-440 (9th ed. 1987).
The plaintiff, DeTomaso, was employed by Pan American World
Airways, Inc. [hereinafter Pan Am] when he purchased several salvage bins supposedly filled with abandoned cargo. A portion of the
cargo was not abandoned, but merely in the process of being transferred to another airline carrier. Through investigation, Pan Am determined that the transfer cargo was stolen somewhere in the chain
of events resulting in sale to the plaintiff. Therefore, DeTomaso was
discharged for fraud, dishonesty, and abuse of company policy.
As part of the investigation, Pan Am's director of security examined the cargo in the plaintiff's garage. The director made remarks in the presence of the plaintiff's son that were interpreted by
the son as an accusation of theft. Evidence presented at trial suggested that relations between DeTomaso and his family deteriorated
after that point.
Based on these and other offensive statements by Pan Am officials,
as well as the termination of his employment, DeTomaso brought
suit in state court for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and breach of warranty of title regarding the purchased
cargo. He had previously instituted a grievance in relation to the termination. The grievance was eventually successful in reinstating the
plaintiff at Pan Am; the decision included restoration of seniority,
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benefits, back pay, and removal of the termination letter from his
file.
At trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff $265,000 in general damages
and $300,000 in punitive damages. Dissatisfied with the trial court's
order for a new trial on the issue of damages, conditioned upon his
acceptance of a remittitur, DeTomaso appealed the order. The court
of appeal reinstated the jury's award due to the failure of the trial
court to comply with section 657 of the Civil Procedure Code. The
appellate court, however, expressly found that the tort claims were
not preempted by the RLA.
The supreme court limited its review of the case to the issue of
RLA preemption. The court cited Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 325 (1972), a United States Supreme Court decision indicating that when the RLA requires a claim to be settled by
processes of arbitration or grievance, those procedures are the claimant's exclusive remedy. The question then became whether the RLA
mandated resolution by such procedures in this case.
The court adopted the preemption test discussed in Magnuson v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1978). A claim is
preempted unless it is evident from the plaintiff's complaint that the
facts underlying the claim either: "(1) are unrelated to matters expressly or impliedly governed by the collective bargaining agreement;
or (2) so far exceed the scope of reasonable conduct in the context of
such matters that reference to the collective bargaining agreement is
unnecessary to resolve the claim." DeTomaso, 43 Cal. 3d at 529, 733
P.2d at 621, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
Finding that DeTomaso's tort claims under state law did not meet
either portion of the test, the supreme court concluded that RLA
preemption was appropriate in this case. The plaintiff's sole remedy
thus lay in the grievance procedures specified by Pan Am's collective
bargaining agreement.
BRUCE MONROE

V.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Receipt of benefits from the Public Employees' Retirement
System does not prevent recovery of benefits from workers'
compensation. In addition, city streets are the workplace
of city police officers, and failure by the city to maintain
its streets in a safe condition will not leave the city open
to a civil suit by an injured officer or officer's dependents:
Jones v. Kaiser Industries Corp.
In Jones v. Kaiser Industries Corp., 43 Cal. 3d 552, 737 P.2d 771, 237
Cal. Rptr. 568 (1987), the California Supreme Court held that surviving dependents who received death benefits from the Public Employees' Retirement System [hereinafter PERS] are not prevented from
receiving benefits from workers' compensation. In addition, the
court ruled that the streets of a city are considered to be the workplace of a city police officer. As a result, the city, acting in the capacity of employer of the police officer, owes a duty to the officer to
maintain the streets in a safe condition. If a hazardous condition
arises due to the city's failure to maintain the streets in a safe condition, and a police officer is injured due to the city's negligence, the
officer's sole remedy is supplied through workers' compensation benefits. Because of the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy in California, an officer or an officer's dependents cannot bring a
common law suit against the city for negligence in maintaining city
streets.
The plaintiffs were the surviving family members of a Fremont
city police officer who was fatally injured in a traffic accident while
officially on duty. The family filed a wrongful death action against
the city, based on their claim that the city maintained a hazardous
condition on the streets in the area where the accident occurred. The
defendant city alleged as an affirmative defense that the plaintiffs
were prohibited from bringing a negligence action because of the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy.
The trial court rejected the defendant's affirmative defense and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with the suit. A jury found in favor of
the defendant, determining that the city was not negligent in its
maintenance of the city streets. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.
The court of appeal reversed the outcome of the jury trial based on
inappropriate jury instructions. More importantly, the court of appeal affirmed that part of the trial court's decision which allowed the
plaintiffs' standing to bring the wrongful death suit. The defendant
then appealed to the supreme court on the single issue of whether
the plaintiffs could properly bring their common-law suit.
The plaintiffs propounded two theories in support of the propriety
of bringing the civil suit. The plaintiffs first claimed that because the
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decedent had been a member of PERS, the defendants were obligated to accept the PERS special death benefit to the exclusion of the
benefits provided by workers' compensation. Under California law, if
the conditions for workers' compensation do not exist, the employee
may proceed with a common law suit against the employer. On the
other hand, if the conditions are met, the workers' compensation
benefits shall represent an injured employee's sole remedy. The
plaintiffs claimed that the existence of PERS benefits rendered
workers' compensation benefits unavailable and, therefore, the lawsuit was properly brought. The supreme court rejected this claim.
The court wrote that section 4707 of the Labor Code states that no
workers' compensation benefits, except burial expenses, would be
awarded to a member or the family of a member of PERS if that
member qualified for the PERS special death benefits. The court explained that this did not preclude payment of workers' compensation
benefits because burial expenses qualified as compensation. In the
present case, the burial expenses were in fact paid to the plaintiffs.
The PERS benefits also provided that in the event the PERS special death benefit was less than what a surviving dependent would receive under workers' compensation then the difference would be paid
to the dependents through workers' compensation. The plaintiffs attempted to argue that since the benefits they received from PERS
were actually higher than what they would have received from workers' compensation, they were effectively prevented from collecting
workers' compensation benefits.
The court rejected this line of thinking for two reasons: (1) workers' compensation benefits had been paid to the plaintiffs in the form
of burial costs, and (2) the court did not believe the legislature could
have intended to allow dependents who happened to get lower PERS
benefits to bring a common law suit while denying the same right to
dependents who received higher payments. The court reasoned that
the purpose of the monetary offset in section 4707 was to ensure that
the surviving dependents received the maximum allowable benefits,
not to decide which victims could file civil suits against the employer.
The second theory proffered by the plaintiffs was that the civil suit
should be allowed through the utilization of the dual capacity doctrine. The dual capacity doctrine represents the proposition that if
an employer stands in a capacity to his employee in addition to that
of employer, which carries with it different obligations than that of
employer, and the employee is injured because of circumstances arising from the additional capacity, the employee may properly bring a

civil suit. See 65 CAL. JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation § 25
(1981).
The court declined to accept this argument. Instead, the court upheld the "well-established rule" that an employer cannot be sued by
an employee for failing to provide a safe area in which to work.
Since the court viewed the streets as the police officer's place of
work, the city could not be sued even if it had been negligent in
maintaining the streets.
The supreme court's decision fortifies the already sturdy employment law philosophy that workers' compensation provides the sole
remedy in employer negligence cases. The court reiterated the advantages the workers' compensation system provided the employees
and then ruled accordingly. The court recognized that allowing the
plaintiffs to bring a common law suit in the present case would seriously erode the protections which workers' compensation provided
employees and employers. The court was wisely unwilling to begin
such an erosion.
MARK J. STUMP

